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Abstract
Small businesses, the majority of Spanish fi rms, rarely fi le for formal bankruptcy, and this 
has been the case even during the current economic crisis. This suggests that bankruptcy 
law has a limited role to play in the distress of small fi rms. We propose an explanation based 
on two premises: (i) bankruptcy procedures are more costly and drawn out than the main 
alternative procedure, the mortgage foreclosure; (ii) personal bankruptcy law is unattractive to 
the individual debtor. Empirical analyses on a large micro data sample of Spanish, French and 
UK fi rms corroborate our hypothesis. It is important to note that these results are based on 
data that do not yet capture the impact of recent reforms of the Spanish insolvency framework.
Keywords: bankruptcy, mortgage, insolvency.
JEL classifi cation: G33, G21, K0.
Resumen
Las empresas pequeñas, que constituyen la mayoría del tejido empresarial español, raramente 
solicitan concurso de acreedores, incluso durante la actual crisis económica. Esto sugiere que 
la Ley Concursal desempeña un papel limitado en la resolución de las difi cultades fi nancieras 
de estas empresas. El presente trabajo propone una explicación de este hecho que se basa 
en dos premisas: i) los concursos de acreedores son más costosos y lentos que la principal 
alternativa, el sistema hipotecario, y ii) los concursos de acreedores son poco atractivos para 
el deudor individual. El análisis empírico de una amplia base de datos de empresas españolas, 
francesas y británicas corrobora nuestra hipótesis. En todo caso, es importante tener en cuenta 
que los resultados de este trabajo se basan en datos que no recogen todavía los efectos de 
las recientes reformas del marco jurídico que gobierna la insolvencia corporativa y personal.
Palabras clave: concurso de acreedores, hipotecas, insolvencia.
Códigos JEL: G33, G21, K0.
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1. Introduction 
 
Business bankruptcy2 rates (number of business bankruptcies divided by the number of 
firms in the economy) in Spain were among the lowest in the world before the current 
economic crisis and they are still relatively low in comparison with most developed 
countries, as documented by Celentani et al. (2010, 2012) and García-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2012). 
 
However, the use of bankruptcy procedures by Spanish businesses varies widely 
depending on the size of the distressed firms. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that 
bankruptcy rates of small, medium and large firms have soared since the onset of the 
economic crisis, reaching levels in line with the aggregate rates of developed countries. 
By contrast, the rates of micro firms –defined as businesses with less than 10 
employees- are still in very low levels, averaging 12 bankruptcy filings per 10,000 firms 
in 2012. We reach a similar conclusion when we restrict our attention to the firms that 
have exited the market by computing the conditional bankruptcy rates (number of 
business bankruptcies over firm exits), as shown in Panel B of Figure 1. Since micro 
firms account for more than 95% of the firms in Spain3, it is essential to know how they 
deal with financial distress4 for the design of adequate insolvency institutions.  
 
Spanish micro firms also have other distinct characteristics. They hold, by far, the 
largest proportion of mortgage loans over financial debt, as shown in Figure 2. Filing 
for bankruptcy is especially unattractive for them because a significant proportion of the 
bankruptcy costs (compensation of the insolvency administrators, lawyers’ fees, etc) are 
fixed. Personal bankruptcy may apply to many of those firms regardless of their legal 
form, because the distinction between limited and unlimited liability may be blurred for 
them, partly because lenders require personal guarantees or security in the form of a 
mortgage on the owner’s home (Berkowitz and White, 2004). Finally, although the 
available evidence is rather limited, Spanish micro firms seem to file for bankruptcy 
much less than some of their European counterparts: in 2006, the bankruptcy rates for 
self-employed and micro enterprises were 0.1 and 1.5 per 10,000 firms, respectively, in 
Spain, while those in France were 95.2 and 163.15, and the bankruptcy rate for self-
employed in the UK exceeded 1766.7  
 
In contrast with the low incidence of business bankruptcies, business foreclosures have 
soared during the crisis. While around 8,000 firms filed for bankruptcy in 2012, there 
                                                
2 Following Djankov et al. (2008), by "bankruptcy" we mean a legal procedure that imposes court 
supervision over the financial affairs of a firm or individual that has broken its promises to creditors or 
honours them with difficulty, and whose possible outcomes are reorganisation or liquidation. See 
Appendix A for a complete discussion on the legal terms used in this paper. 
3 Source: Central Business Register, National Statistics Institute of Spain.   
4 By “financial distress” we mean a situation in which a firm is close to default and it needs to take 
corrective action, such a selling major assets, merging with another firm or filing for bankruptcy (Ross et 
al., 2005). 
5 Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Altares (2010), Eurostat.  
6 Figures on bankruptcy filings for self-employed are only available for England and Wales, so the 
computed bankruptcy rate (176) is a lower bound of that for the U.K.  
7 Sources: The Insolvency Service, Eurostat. 
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were nearly 26,000 business foreclosures8 in the same year. Moreover, the latter figure 
must be considered a lower bound, since small business owners may finance their firms 
with loans secured on their homes (Berkowitz and White, 2004) but, if lenders 
repossess the collateral, they will be reflected as residential foreclosures in the official 
statistics.   
 
Parenthetically, a foreclosure –either on firms’ assets or households’ properties- could 
be defined as “a debt enforcement procedure aimed at recovering the money owed to 
secured creditors” (Djankov et al. 2008). There are different types of foreclosures 
depending on which collateral can be repossessed using a single execution procedure. 
Since this paper concentrates on the analysis of small firms and entrepreneurs, and land 
and buildings are the main assets that can be given as collateral by them9, we will focus 
on “mortgage over land and buildings” foreclosures. For brevity of exposition, we shall 
refer to “mortgage over land and buildings” as just “mortgage” throughout the paper. 
In other words, by “mortgage” we will mean a loan secured by land and buildings 
(hipoteca under Spanish law), and not by other types of collateral10. This is an 
important remark because there are other types of mortgages in some legal systems such 
as the British one. For more details on some relevant legal concepts and their 
comparability across countries we refer the reader to Appendix A.   
                                                
8 Source: Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012) and Registradores de España (2012). 
9 For instance, the entrepreneur’s home and other residential properties. According to the Eurosystem 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey, these assets accounted for 77.6% of the total wealth of 
households in Spain and 67.5% in France. 
10 Machinery can also be part of the collateral of the hipoteca as long as they are inside the building. 
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Figure 1: Bankruptcy rates by size in Spain. 
 
Panel A: Business bankruptcy rates 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Conditional bankruptcy rates. 
 
Quarterly data except for the first period 04C3, which corresponds to the last 4 months of 2004. Rates are 
annualized. Source: authors’ calculations on data from the Spanish National Statistics Institute. Size is 
measured in terms of employees. Micro: [0,9], small: [10,49], medium & large: >50. Non-micro: >9.  
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Figure 2: % mortgage loans over bank debt by business size in Spain. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office, Banco de España.  
 
Consistent with those stylized facts, our hypothesis on the low business bankruptcy 
rates of Spanish micro firms is that those businesses and their lenders avoid filing for 
bankruptcy by making possible that creditors foreclose (execute) the collaterals of the 
loan contracts. Since most of their secured credits are mortgage loans (préstamos 
hipotecarios)11, debt enforcement takes place via mortgage foreclosures (ejecuciones 
hipotecarias), which consist of the repossession of the land and buildings that were 
pledged as collateral.  This is a more attractive way to deal with financial distress 
because mortgage foreclosures are much cheaper and quicker than the bankruptcy 
system (concurso de acreedores). Furthermore, personal bankruptcy is a very 
unattractive option because it is extremely severe towards the individual debtor. Since 
the costs of filing for personal bankruptcy are substantial while the benefits are almost 
none, (de jure or de facto) unlimited liability firms have strong incentives to avoid filing 
for bankruptcy and use mortgage foreclosures instead.  
 
We can summarise our hypothesis as: 
 
H0 : The low bankruptcy rates of Spanish micro firms are due to an institutional 
framework that discourages the use of the bankruptcy system and encourages the use of 
an alternative procedure, mortgage foreclosures.  
 
The hypothesis H0  implies that small financially distressed firms with a high proportion 
of mortgage debt should rarely file for bankruptcy in Spain, while this phenomenon 
should not be observed in other institutional settings where the bankruptcy system is 
more appealing than mortgage foreclosures or secured credit does not heavily rely on 
                                                
11 Notice in Figure 2 that mortgage loans currently account for more than 50% of all bank loans of micro 
firms, and bank loans account for most of the credit to small businesses in Spain (Arce et al., 2011).  
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land and buildings as collateral. While we cannot directly test H0 , we can test its 
implication. If the empirical evidence corroborates this implication, we can conclude 
that H0  is not falsified by our analyses, shedding some light on the research question.  
 
Hence, the identification strategy consists of testing whether a higher percentage of 
mortgage loans imply a lower probability of filing for bankruptcy in the case of small 
Spanish distressed firms. As the comparison group we use distressed firms from France 
and the U.K., as well as large Spanish firms. In France mortgage foreclosures are slower 
and more costly than the bankruptcy system. In the UK firms need not hold high 
amounts of land, buildings or other related tangible fixed assets to obtain secured credit, 
since the high efficiency that the floating charge brings to insolvency procedures makes 
the use of mortgage foreclosures less necessary.  
 
Table 1 illustrates our approach. Since we cannot directly test whether A (the Spanish 
institutional framework) causes C (the low bankruptcy rates in Spain)12, what we do is 
to test whether B (the endogenous responses of firms and lenders) causes C –obviously, 
controlling for the endogeneity of B- in Spain, while B does not cause C in other 
institutional settings.  
 
Table 1: Our view of the Spanish case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 To carry out that strategy we would need time series variation of the institutional framework. 
However, although the current bankruptcy system entered into force in 2004 after a major legislative 
reform, it seems that the de facto institutional framework barely changed because the performance of 
bankruptcy proceedings did not seem to substantially improve (Gutiérrez, 2005; Van Hemmen, 2004). In 
fact, bankruptcy rates did not increase after the introduction of the new law and it seems that firms’ 
capital and asset structures did not change either (Celentani et al., 2010).   
A: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Bankrupty system:
-corporate: slow and costly procedures
-personal: no debt discharge.
VS
Mortgage foreclosures:
quicker and cheaper procedures.
⇓
B: ENDOGENOUS RESPONSES OF FIRMS AND LENDERS
Lenders provide mortgage loans.
Firms adjust their capital and asset structures.
⇓
C: LOW BANKRUPTCY RATES
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Our main findings do not falsify the proposed hypothesis. Specifically, a higher 
proportion of tangible fixed assets (the only assets can that be used as mortgage 
collateral in Spain) over total financial debt significantly decrease the probability of 
being in bankruptcy among Spanish micro firms in financial distress, while this does not 
hold neither for Spanish larger businesses nor for firms from the other countries (France 
and the UK).  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that addresses the research question. 
Claessens and Klapper (2005) use country-level data to explain bankruptcy rates around 
the world. They find that a country’s overall institutional quality and some features of 
bankruptcy systems (creditors’ consent for reorganisation, automatic stay of creditors’ 
claims) are associated with more bankruptcies. However, since Spain, according to 
Claessens and Klapper, has high institutional quality and its bankruptcy system requires 
creditors’ consent for reorganisation and provides an automatic stay provision, Spain 
should exhibit high (aggregate) bankruptcy rates.  
 
Celentani, García-Posada and Gómez (2010, 2012) address the (aggregate) low 
bankruptcy rates in Spain. Their main objective is to propose an explanation that is not 
immediately contradicted by a number of related aggregate stylized facts that they 
document. Specifically, they use the theoretical prediction of Ayotte and Yun (2007), 
according to which low creditor protection and low judicial ability imply low 
bankruptcy rates, to conjecture a wide set of activities (leverage reduction, lenders’ 
screening and monitoring, choice of projects that trade off return for lower risk and/or 
lower liquidation costs, use of mortgage collateral) in which firms and their creditors 
could potentially engage to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. García-Posada and 
Mora-Sanguinetti (2012) also address the same research question, but focusing on the 
correlations between the percentage of tangible fixed assets in firms’ balance sheet, 
several determinants of financial distress and the probability of filing for formal 
bankruptcy.  
 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, it studies the 
different behaviour towards bankruptcy of Spanish micro firms relative to that of larger 
firms, something that has been overlooked before. Second, it uses an identification 
strategy that allows establishing causal links between the factors of interest.   
 
Finally, we must stress why explaining the low business bankruptcy rates of Spanish 
micro firms is important. Although it is well known that enforcement of security 
interests can substitute for a court-supervised bankruptcy procedure if coordination 
costs are low (Picker, 1992), Djankov et al. (2008) provide survey evidence that 
foreclosures work extremely well when coupled with “floating charge” debt securities 
(i.e., when the assets of the entire business can be used as collateral), but poorly when –
as in the case of Spain- only specific assets can be used as collateral. This finding goes 
in line with the theoretical analysis of García-Posada (2012), who shows that the 
Spanish institutional framework, characterised by the wide use of mortgage foreclosures 
and the low utilisation of bankruptcy proceedings, may generate several inefficiencies 
that have a negative impact on aggregate welfare. Moreover, an unattractive personal 
insolvency law may not only discourage self-employed and micro firms from filing for 
bankruptcy, but it may also deter entrepreneurship (Fan and White, 2003, Armour and 
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Cumming, 2008), efficient risk-taking and innovation (Armour, 2004) and consequently 
it may have a negative impact on welfare (Meh and Terajima, 2008).  
 
This paper’s results are based on data that do not capture yet the impact of the recent 
reforms of the Spanish insolvency framework –regarding both corporate and personal 
bankruptcy13. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as reflecting the situation 
before the introduction of these reforms.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
overview. Section 3 discusses some key features of the insolvency framework of Spain, 
France and the U.K. Section 4 focuses on data sources and sample selection criteria. 
Section 5 explains the empirical testing of the hypothesis. Section 6 concludes. Some 
robustness analyses and additional information on the insolvency institutions of each 
country are displayed in the appendices.  
 
 
2. Related literature  
 
 
Although there is a vast literature on bankruptcy, only few studies have focused on 
alternative mechanisms to deal with financial distress and the impact of the insolvency 
framework in lenders’ practices and firms’ capital and asset structures.   
 
Djankov et al. (2008), in their study of debt enforcement institutions in 88 countries, 
provide survey evidence on the use and efficiency of foreclosures and bankruptcy 
procedures14. They find that the efficiency of foreclosure rises with the availability of 
“floating charge” finance and when the senior creditor is allowed to take collateral in an 
out-of-court procedure. Franks and Sussman (2005) corroborate those results, providing 
compelling evidence that the “contractualist” approach15 of debt enforcement, coupled 
with floating charge foreclosures, worked extremely well for small and medium-sized 
firms in the U.K. The main findings of Djankov et al. (2008) and Franks and Sussman 
(2005) have been formally rationalised by Gennaioli and Rossi (2013).  
 
Morrison (2008a, 2008b) studies why US small firms rarely file for bankruptcy when 
dealing with financial distress. He argues that there are cheaper and speedier procedures 
for these firms, such as foreclosures, out-of-court liquidations and private workouts. 
However, some of these procedures, unlike the bankruptcy system, face major 
coordination and asymmetric information problems that may hamper their use. Thus he 
identifies the conditions under which these problems are not very important so those 
procedures can be implemented: small firms, with simple capital structures (i.e., low 
number of secured creditors) and with close and trustworthy relationships with their 
creditors are likely to avoid filing for bankruptcy. 
                                                
13 Appendix A includes a discussion on some of the latest legal developments in Spain in this issue. 
14 Categorised into “liquidation” and “reorganization first” procedures. 
15 By “contractualist” approach we mean debt enforcement procedures with little involvement of the 
judiciary, where the law “…is little more than the strict enforcement of the default clauses in the debt 
contract, as negotiated ex ante by the lender and the borrower” (Franks and Sussman, 2005, page 66) 
where agents can resolve financial distress privately, by using debt contracts, instead of relying on state-
provided bankruptcy procedures.  
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Davydenko and Franks (2008) use a sample of small defaulted firms in France, 
Germany and the U.K. that restructured their debt using either bankruptcy or private 
workouts. Their main finding is that lenders adjust their lending and reorganisation 
practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy laws. In particular, they respond to 
poor creditor protection under bankruptcy by requiring more collateral and by relying 
on types of collateral that minimise the dilution of their claims. Hence, both lenders 
practices and firms’ capital and asset structures are endogenous to the insolvency 
framework.  
 
Finally, a strand in the literature has focused on the determinants of private workouts, 
starting with the seminal paper of Gilson et al. (1990). According to them, firms more 
likely to restructure their debt privately, outside of Chapter 11, have more intangible 
assets, owe more of their debt to banks, and owe fewer lenders. This is because, while 
trade credit is often dispersed among a large number of poorly informed small trade 
creditors, bank credit, in contrast, tends to be concentrated in a smaller number of better 
informed lenders with stronger incentives to monitor the firm, which ameliorates 
coordination and information asymmetry problems.  
 
 
3. Insolvency framework: the bankruptcy system and mortgage foreclosures.  
 
In order to provide an adequate basis for the econometric exercise, it is necessary to 
analyse in-depth the insolvency framework of the countries of interest. Those are Spain, 
France and the UK. France and the U.K. are chosen as the comparison group because 
their bankruptcy rates are much higher than the Spanish ones and because the specific 
features of their insolvency frameworks16. We must exclude other potentially interesting 
examples (e.g. Germany and the US) due data constraints17.  In this section we will only 
focus in the institutional factors that may influence on the arbitration between 
bankruptcy and alternative ways of solving default, such as the cost-effectiveness of the 
procedures, while Appendix A provides an description of the main legal concepts used 
in this paper. For a more thorough analysis of the insolvency frameworks –especially 
the bankruptcy laws- see Celentani et al. (2010, 2012) and Davydenko and Franks 
(2008).  
 
An important remark that must be made is about the data we use to evaluate the 
performance of each insolvency institution. An easy, off-the-shelf solution would be to 
use the survey-based Doing Business indicators, whose methodology is based on 
Djankov et al. (2008). The survey is based on a hypothetical case study on a firm for 
which they assume exogenous capital and asset structures that do not vary across 
countries. However, their study finds somewhat puzzling results for the Spanish case. 
First, it predicts that the firm will end up filing for bankruptcy, while bankruptcy is 
rarely used in Spain. Second, the survey estimates indicate that bankruptcy procedures 
are relatively quick in Spain and constant over time, while hard data (see below) shows 
that they are usually quite lengthy and their duration has dramatically increased due to 
the congestion of courts in the current economic crisis. A couple of factors that may 
                                                
16 They are also representative examples of the two main world “legal families”: Civil Law and Common 
Law, respectively. 
17 Our data come from the office of the Registrar of Companies of each country, but only large firms 
have the legal obligation to register their annual accounts in Germany. In the case of the US, the available 
data is at plant-level, while the decision to file for bankruptcy is made at firm-level. 
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explain those contradictions is that firms endogenously adjust their asset and capital 
structures to the specific features of their country’s insolvency institutions, as shown by 
Davydenko and Franks (2008), and that the results may be sensitive to the nature of the 
hypothetical employed (Armour et al, 2012).  Hence we prefer to use hard data from 
other sources and use the Doing Business only when no other data is available and with 
all the necessary cautions.  
 
 
 
 3.1 Alternative insolvency procedures: informal workouts and foreclosures.  
 
When a firm defaults on its debt, filing for bankruptcy is just one of the available 
alternatives. There are other procedures that may be cheaper and speedier for some 
types of businesses and creditors.  First, in the case of a secured loan, the creditor can 
seize the assets that serve as collateral for the loan (foreclosure). Second, in the case of 
an unsecured loan, the creditor can call on the court to sell some of the debtor’s assets 
(individual enforcement of claims). Finally, the firm and its creditors may attempt to 
reach an out-of-court agreement (private workout).  
 
Foreclosures substantially differ across countries in several important dimensions. The 
insolvent company or the unsecured creditors can cause a stay of foreclosure 
proceedings by filing for bankruptcy in France, whereas filing for bankruptcy does not 
stop foreclosure in the U.K and it is limited in time and scope in the case of Spain. In 
some countries a foreclosure can be an entirely out-of-court procedure, a private 
contractual solution in which a receiver liquidates the company (piecemeal or as a going 
concern) to maximise the recovery of the floating charge holder. This used to be case of 
administrative receivership in the U.K. prior to the Enterprise Act 2002. In France, a 
court oversees the foreclosure. In Spain, a foreclosure may be either judicial or out-of-
court if supervised by a notary18.  
 
Foreclosures do not protect unsecured creditors, who must rely on separate insolvency 
proceedings to individually enforce their claims. This method of debt collection runs 
into difficulties when there are many creditors and the debtor’s assets do not cover his 
liabilities, since they may lead to creditors’ races and the dismantlement of the firm’s 
assets, implying a loss of value for all creditors. 
 
An informal workout is a private reorganisation process in which the major financial 
creditors of the distressed company act in a coordinated manner to either restructure its 
debt, so that the company can be kept as a going concern, or to liquidate the company’s 
assets in a orderly manner. Regardless of its potential advantages vis-à-vis formal 
bankruptcy -cost savings, avoidance of adverse publicity- it is often unfeasible due to 
coordination and asymmetric information problems (Gilson et al., 1990, Morrison, 
2008a, 2008b).  
 
The choice between mortgage foreclosures and the bankruptcy system will mainly 
depend on which procedure is more cost-effective, in terms of the duration of its 
proceedings and costs for the contract parties (court fees, fees of insolvency 
administrators, auctioneers, lawyers).  
 
                                                
18 See Appendix A. 
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3.2 Bankruptcy laws: corporate and personal.  
 
 
In order to study the potential impact of the insolvency framework on the arbitration 
between bankruptcy and alternative ways of solving default, both corporate bankruptcy 
and personal bankruptcy laws must be examined. Personal bankruptcy laws may be 
used by non-corporate businesses and by small corporate firms (Berkowitz and White, 
2004). When a business is non-corporate, its debts are personal liabilities of the firm’s 
owner. When a firm is a small corporation, lenders often require personal guarantees 
that wipe out the owner’s limited liability. This may be especially important in the case 
of Spain since, as previously discussed, small firms account for a large proportion of the 
total stock of firms and their bankruptcy rates are the lowest.   
 
The Spanish bankruptcy system (Ley Concursal), which entered into force in 200419, 
only had, until very recently, an insolvency procedure, the concurso de acreedores, both 
for firms and individual debtors20, though there is a simplified procedure (concurso 
abreviado) that the Court may follow in certain circumstances. The redressement 
judiciaire and the liquidation judiciaire are the main insolvency procedures for 
corporations in France, although a new procedure, the sauvegarde, was introduced in the 
latest reform of the bankruptcy code (Loi de sauvegarde des entreprises), which came 
became effective in 2006. There are two different procedures for personal bankruptcy: 
the plan de redressement and the procedure de rétablissement personnel21. Although 
various corporate insolvency procedures coexist in the U.K., administration is the most 
important one since the entry into force of the Enterprise Act 200222, and “Bankruptcy” 
is the most common procedure used by individuals23.  
 
3.3 Choice of insolvency mechanism in Spain, France and the U.K.  
 
3.3.1 Spain  
 
Since the Spanish bankruptcy law allows both the debtor and the creditors to initiate the 
proceedings (concurso voluntario and concurso necesario, respectively) we must 
identify which features of the insolvency framework discourage the former or the latter 
from doing it.  Mortgage foreclosures are an attractive alternative to bankruptcy because 
they are much quicker and cheaper than bankruptcy procedures, which deter both 
debtors and creditors from filing from bankruptcy. Moreover, the personal bankruptcy 
law is very unattractive on the debtor’s perspective because of its severity, while it does 
not yield any extra benefits to the creditors relative to mortgage foreclosures.  
 
                                                
19 The current Act has been modified twice, one in March 2009 and the other at the end of 2011, both 
trying to cope with various dysfunctional features in the initial design.  
20 In September 2013 the Spanish Parliament has approved some legal reforms that will create some sort 
of special bankruptcy regime for self-employed individuals. See Appendix A., section 6, for details.  
21 See Blazy et al. (2011, page 6) for an excellent discussion of those procedures.  
22 September 2003. 
23 In the U.K. the term “bankruptcy” only applies to individuals, while insolvency is the term that applies 
to companies.  
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The usual length of a mortgage foreclosure is 7 to 9 months (European Mortgage 
Federation, 2007)24, while the median duration of a bankruptcy process in 2007 ranged 
between 20 and 23 months25 (Van Hemmen, 2008). Furthermore, the modest increase in 
the number of bankruptcy filings due to the economic crisis has implied a congestion of 
the courts and a dramatic increase in the median length of the procedures: between 27 
and 36 months in the period 2008-2010 (Van Hemmen, 2009, 2010, 2011).26  
 
There is a consensus among practitioners on mortgage foreclosures being much cheaper 
than bankruptcy filings. A mortgage foreclosure is a well-defined and quite standardised 
process with a low degree of uncertainty about its final outcome, so that its 
implementation is subject to economies of scale (the bank files several foreclosure 
lawsuits at the same time, only changing the details of the debtor and the collateral). By 
contrast, bankruptcy procedures are much more complex and uncertain and they often 
involve high information asymmetries between the company and its creditors, requiring 
a great deal of intervention by the court, insolvency administrators, lawyers, etc. This is 
corroborated by survey evidence. According to European Mortgage Federation (2007), 
the total costs of foreclosures are between the 5% and 15% of the price obtained in the 
auction of the collateral (the percentage decreases as the sale price increases) while the 
Doing Business estimates 15%.  
 
 
Finally, there is no discharge in personal bankruptcy (all the present and future income 
of the debtor must be used to pay back pre-bankruptcy debts) and homestead 
exemptions are very low. Since the costs of filing for bankruptcy are high 
(compensation of insolvency administrators, lawyers’ fees, etc) while the benefits are 
almost none in the absence of a discharge, Spanish small firms have strong incentives to 
avoid personal bankruptcy and use the mortgage foreclosures instead, as they are going 
to have unlimited liability either way.  
 
 
 
3.3.2 France  
 
The debtor, creditors, the public prosecutor and the court itself may initiate bankruptcy 
procedures in France. 
 
Mortgage foreclosures are not such an attractive alternative to bankruptcy in France, 
unlike Spain, because they are slower and more costly than bankruptcy procedures. 
Moreover, personal bankruptcy may be an attractive way to solve insolvency in the case 
of small firms and self-employed. The usual length of a mortgage foreclosure is 
between 15 and 25 months (European Mortgage Federation, 2007), while the average 
duration of bankruptcy proceedings in 2007 was 14.2 months (Ministère de la Justice, 
2010). According to European Mortgage Federation (2007), the total costs of 
                                                
24 Some of the legislative changes concerning the Spanish mortgage law (Ley Hipotecaria) introduced in 
2013 may increase the length of mortgage foreclosures in the future (see Appendix A, section 6 for 
details), but not in the period of study of this research.    
25 20 months for the simplified procedure (concurso abreviado), 23 for the ordinary (concurso 
ordinario).  
26 Similar estimations are provided by the General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del 
Poder Judicial, 2011).  
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foreclosures are between the 10% and 12% of the price of allocation while the Doing 
Business estimates 9% in the case of bankruptcy procedures.  
 
In the case of personal bankruptcy, there is immediate debt discharge in the procedure 
de retablissement personnel. The plan de redressement, although it mainly consists of a 
reorganisation plan through debt renegotiation, if the renegotiation between the debtor 
and his main creditors fails, the judge may enforce a debt restructuring schedule by 
ruling that the debtor do not have to reimburse their debts for a maximum of two years 
and he can also partly reduce the debts or elaborate a schedule of repayment for 
creditors27.  
  
3.3.3 U.K.  
 
Mortgage foreclosures are not expected to be an appealing alternative procedure 
because they are not significantly faster nor cheaper than bankruptcy procedures. The 
usual length of a foreclosure is between 8 and 12 months (European Mortgage 
Federation, 2007), while the average length of bankruptcy proceedings (administration) 
is less than 1 year (Armour et al. 2012, Frisby, 2006). According to European Mortgage 
Federation (2007), the total costs of foreclosures are around 5%28 while the Doing 
Business estimates 6% in the case of bankruptcy procedures.  
 
More important, the high efficiency that a particular type of loan security, the floating 
charge -which does not exist in neither Spain nor France- used to bring to foreclosures 
and now brings to bankruptcy procedures29 makes the use of mortgage foreclosures less 
necessary.   
 
Prior to the Enterprise Act (2002), secured creditors were almost entirely in charge of 
the foreclosure procedure under an administrative receivership scheme. The holder of a 
floating charge on the business, commonly one bank providing the bulk of finance to 
the company, could appoint, with almost no other constraints, as soon as there was a 
default in the loan, a receiver who would take over the entire company, and would try to 
maximize recovery for the holder of the floating charge30. Since preferential credit 
(wage arrears and tax debts) was senior to floating charges but junior to fixed charges, 
Franks and Sussman (2005) showed that British banks used to take both a fixed and a 
floating charge to enjoy both control rights over the bankruptcy process and seniority 
over most of the proceeds of the sale. This also eliminated coordination failures: there 
was little litigation and no evidence of creditors’ runs. All these factors resulted in fast 
and cheap procedures, as also documented in Djankov et al. (2008). Appendix A 
provides legal definitions of both fixed and floating charges. 
 
For floating charges created after the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002  (September 
2003), enforcement otherwise than by formal bankruptcy proceedings has been 
                                                
27 On condition that debts will be totally reimbursed during a period of ten years at most. 
28 For a sales price set at € 100,000.  
29 The insolvency regime before the Enterprise Act 2002, administrative receivership, is normally 
characterised as a foreclosure, since it was a procedure for the enforcement of a security interest (a 
“floating charge”) covering all or nearly all the assets of the debtor firm, while the current regime, 
administration, is normally classified as a bankruptcy procedure (Djankov et al, 2008). 
30 This normally did not imply piecemeal liquidation of the assets, but the sale of the business to a new 
entrepreneur.  
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prohibited. This means that the insolvency regime has switched from foreclosures 
(administrative receiverships) to bankruptcy (administration)31. Although under 
administration floating charges grant less control rights to the secured creditor than 
under receivership, the bank may, under some conditions, appoint an administrator who 
takes over the management -although he owes duties also to other creditors and to the 
company itself. The secured creditor, even without court order and proof of insolvency, 
may initiate the procedure. The company management is entirely replaced, and the 
administrator is supervised by the court, and by a committee of creditors. Hence, even 
under the new regime (administration), creditors have strong incentives to use 
insolvency proceedings rather than mortgage foreclosures.  
  
Finally, in the case of personal bankruptcy, debt discharge is allowed one year after the 
end of the procedure, giving clear incentives to small firms and self-employed to file for 
bankruptcy.   
 
 
3.4. Scope for private workouts: Spain vs. France.   
 
Since private workouts are feasible when bargaining costs are low, one could argue that 
they are the main mechanism through which Spanish micro firms and their lenders 
avoid filing for bankruptcy. Small firms usually have few creditors and they may have 
engaged in “relationship lending” with their main bank, hence reducing coordination 
and asymmetric information problems. While, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
available evidence on the incidence of workouts in Spain relative to that in other 
countries, there are several arguments why we think workouts cannot explain the 
extremely low bankruptcy rates of the very small firms in Spain.  
 
First, although there is an automatic stay over the enforcement of secured credit in 
Spanish bankruptcy proceedings, this only involves secured credit over assets that are 
integrated in the debtor’s production process –as considered by the court- and only for 1 
year or until a restructuring plan that does not affect their rights is approved, whichever 
occurs first. Moreover, the law allows the insolvency administrator to pay secured 
creditors out of the company’s total assets during the stay, i.e., without the enforcement 
of their security interests32. The restrictive legislation on the stay, as well as its 
uncertain scope, implies that mortgage creditors are unlikely to be held up by a debtor.  
 
By contrast, debtors are expected to have much more bargaining power outside 
bankruptcy in France because the bankruptcy law determines an automatic stay for 
secured creditors until the end of the procedure and because of the high dilution that 
mortgage credit suffers inside bankruptcy. This is because French bankruptcy courts 
tend to sell the assets below their potential market prices, as they are not obliged to sell 
the assets to the highest bidder, but they can sell the whole company to a lower bidder 
that commits to preserve employment33 (Davydenko and Franks, 2008), and the state 
places its own claims and those of employees first in priority when the collateral is sold. 
This implies that French creditors may be more willing to make some debt concessions 
in a private workout than Spanish creditors.  
 
                                                
31 See Armour et al. (2012) and Appendix A for further details on this evolution.  
32 Article 155 of the Ley Concursal.  
33 Creditors’ approval is not required for the sale of their collateral. 
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Hence it seems implausible to explain the large differences in the bankruptcy rates of 
micro firms and self-employed in Spain and France in terms of the relative incidence of 
private workouts in those countries. Since those rates are low in Spain and high in 
France, workouts should be abundant in Spain and rare in France, while an analysis of 
the incentives to file for bankruptcy by debtors and creditors in those countries suggests 
the opposite.   
 
 
4. Data  
 
The firm-level data come from the OECD-Orbis database, which is the result of the 
treatment of raw data from the commercial database Orbis by the OECD (Ribeiro, 
Menghinello and De Backer, 2010, and Ragoussis and Gonnard, 2011). Orbis contains 
financial information on both private and publicly held companies around the world 
although coverage, especially of small firms, greatly varies across countries. Orbis also 
provides other firm-level information, such as year of incorporation, industry, legal 
form and status. Status is a variable that tells the legal and economic condition of the 
firm (e.g. if the company is active or it has ceased its operations, and if it is undergoing 
some bankruptcy procedure or not) only at the moment in which the data are extracted 
from the database, i.e., no historical records are kept. Since the data from Orbis were 
extracted in 2010 (December 31, 2010), we have the status of each company at that 
time.  
 
Regarding the sample selection, we use data on firms from three countries: Spain, 
France and the U.K. We only keep their financial data for 2008 because of two reasons. 
First, the main variable in all our analyses will be constructed using the information on 
status, which is only available for 2010. This makes panel data an unfeasible structure 
for the sample, since the variation in the main variable will happen across sections, but 
not across time. Second, because of the time lag in the submission of financial 
statements by firms, the Orbis database is characterised by a typical time lag of two 
years (Ribeiro, Menghinello and De Backer, 2010), which implies that the coverage (in 
number of companies and complete records) for 2009 and 2010 is very poor, leaving 
2008 as the best choice. We only keep financially distressed firms because we aim to 
test whether Spanish small firms behave differently when dealing with financial 
distress. In other words, what we want to model is the probability of bankruptcy 
conditional on financial distress. While it is probably safe to assume that all firms under 
bankruptcy proceedings are distressed (rarely will a healthy business file a bankruptcy 
petition), for the rest of observations we proxy distressed businesses as those whose 
interest coverage ratio (EBITDA over interest expenses) is lower than 1. After applying 
all these filters34 we end up with a sample of more than 150,000 observations 
comprising both firms under bankruptcy proceedings (henceforth, bankrupt firms) and 
distressed businesses that have not filed for bankruptcy (henceforth, non-bankrupt 
firms).   
 
Since Orbis is a commercial database, our sample may not be representative of the 
whole population of Spanish, French and British firms. In order to increase the 
representativeness and the external validity of our results we construct sampling 
                                                
34 We also exclude state-owned companies, non-profit organisations and membership organisations. To 
avoid double-counting of information we eliminate all consolidated accounts for which unconsolidated 
information exists. Finally, we remove inconsistent observations and extreme values. 
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weights using data from the OECD’s Structural and Demographic Business Statistics 
(SDBS) and the Spanish Statistical Institute (INE). SDBS provides the distribution of 
enterprises in each economy by detailed industrial sector (up to 4-digit level) and by 
size class35, while INE has the distribution of Spanish bankrupt firms by size and 
industry36. Hence, by weighting our observations we can correct sampling biases. A 
caveat of this approach is that, since the SDBS does not have information on some 
industries37, we must throw away some firms, ending up with around 136,000 
observations. Nevertheless, since there is no consensus in the literature about the use of 
sampling weights in regression techniques (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), the analyses 
will be implemented using both the unweighted and the weighted sample in order to 
check for the robustness of our results.   
 
Table 2 shows the number and percentage over the total number of companies of micro 
firms, by country, for both samples. We can see that those percentages are somewhat 
higher in the weighted sample in the case of Spain and France, while they are 
dramatically higher in the U.K., indicating that micro firms are underrepresented in the 
unweighted sample, especially in the U.K.   
 
Table 3 shows the number and percentage over the total number of companies of 
bankrupt firms, by country and by size, of both samples. We can observe that, in the 
case of the unweighted sample, although the percentage of bankrupt firms is the lowest 
for Spain, the differences relative to France and the U.K. are much smaller than the 
differences in bankruptcy rates reported in the introduction38. However, this is not 
longer the case in the weighted sample, where the percentages of bankrupt firms in 
France and the U.K are more than 60 times larger than that of Spain, in line with the 
differences in bankruptcy rates, and the percentage of Spanish micro firms under 
bankruptcy is much lower than that of their non-micro counterparts, also in line with the 
aggregate evidence. Hence the oversampling of Spanish bankrupt firms in the 
unweighted sample enhances the internal validity of our estimations because, given the 
rarity of bankruptcy filings, a simple random sample will not yield enough bankruptcies 
to implement statistical analyses, while the correction of this sampling bias with the 
weighted sample ensures the external validity of our results.  
                                                
35 The size class breakdowns, according to the number of employees, are: 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-249, 250 
or more.  
36 Unfortunately we did not have analogous information on French and British firms. However, the 
examination of the sample (see below) revealed that the main source of sampling bias was the case of 
Spanish bankrupt firms.   
37 Specifically, the SDBS has no information on the following industries (ISIC Rev. 3): Agriculture, 
hunting and forestry; Fishing; Financial Intermediation; Education; Health and social work; Other 
community, social and personal service activities.  
38 Although notice that bankruptcy rates are the proportion of bankrupt firms over the total stock of firms 
in the population, while these percentages are the proportion of bankrupt firms over the number of 
distressed firms in the sample.  
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Table 2: number of micro firms and % over the total number of firms. 
 
Table 3: number of bankrupt firms and % over the total number of firms. 
 
 
 
 
For the empirical analyses of this paper we need to construct several variables. 
Bankruptcy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm was bankrupt when the data 
were extracted (2010). As for our key regressor, since the Orbis database does not 
contain specific information on mortgage loans, we need to construct a proxy for the 
proportion of those loans on total debt. The proposed proxy is “Tangibility”, which is 
computed as the ratio between tangible fixed assets (land, buildings, plant and 
machinery)39 to financial debt, in percentage terms. Since tangible fixed assets are the 
only assets that can be used as mortgage collateral in Spain, we relate those assets with 
the debts they may secure. This is also suggested by Figure 3. As expected, 
“Construction and real estate services” has by far the highest percentage of mortgage 
loans, while the lowest percentage corresponds to financial services. As controls, we 
will use the firm’s age (in logs), the firm’s size –computed as the number of 
employees40, in logs- and industry dummies. According to Berger and Udell (1995) and 
                                                
39 Plant and machinery can also be mortgage collateral as long as they are inside the buildings.  
40 Since the number of employees were missing for a non-negligible part of the sample, values have been 
imputed using Poisson regressions for each country, where the predictor variables were a proprietary 
variable of Orbis that has four size categories according to several size measures (revenue, total assets,                                                                                                                               
employees and whether the firm is listed) and industry dummies. Nevertheless, this paper’s results –
available upon request- do not qualitatively change when total assets or turnover are used as alternative 
measures.  
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Petersen and Rajan (1994), firm’s age captures the public reputation of the firm, since 
they find a negative relationship between firms’ age and interest rate premium charged 
by banks. Davydenko and Franks (2008) interpret age as a proxy for information 
asymmetries between a firm and its lenders, since they find a negative impact of age on 
the probability of filing for bankruptcy (vis-à-vis using out-court procedures). With 
respect to firm’s size, small firms may file less for bankruptcy if a substantial proportion 
of the bankruptcy costs are fixed (Morrison, 2008a and 2008b) or if personal insolvency 
laws are very severe, although the relationship between size and bankruptcy need not be 
linear because very large firms may prefer to avoid the adverse publicity of a 
bankruptcy filing.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage of mortgage loans over financial debt by industry in Spain. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Central Credit Register, Banco de España. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the regressors for the unweighted sample. The 
Spanish distressed firms have, on average, slightly higher Tangibility than their British 
counterparts and much more than the French ones. They are substantially smaller. More 
insights are found when we split the sample into micro and non-micro firms and 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt ones (Table 5). In the case of micro firms (panel A), 
distressed non-bankrupt firms have much higher levels of Tangibility in Spain, while 
the opposite occurs in France and the U.K. Non-micro firms follow the same pattern, 
but the positive gap between bankrupt and non-bankrupt in Spain is now smaller. As 
expected, non-bankrupt Spanish firms are smaller and younger for both size classes, 
while those patterns are not so clear in France and the U.K. 
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Table 4: descriptive statistics (unweighted sample) 
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Table 5: descriptive statistics by size and bankruptcy status (unweighted sample) 
 
 
The statistical significance of differences in means is evaluated through one-sided p-values of two-sample 
t-tests. These tests can be implemented with and without the assumption of equal population variances. In 
order to ascertain whether this assumption is plausible, two tests for the equality of variances have been 
implemented in each case. The selected tests are those of Brown and Forsythe (1974), since they are 
robust to non-normality and the variables of this study have been found to be non-normal.  
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The main implication of our hypothesis is that holding mortgage debt should reduce the 
probability of filing for bankruptcy by a small financially distressed firm in Spain, while 
this relationship should not be observed in other institutional settings where the 
bankruptcy system is more efficient than mortgage foreclosures, such as France and the 
U.K.   
 
In this section we test this implication by running within-country regressions to assess 
the sign and size of the relationship between a proxy for the percentage of mortgage 
debt, Tangibility, and the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a financially distressed 
firm in each country, once other determinants are controlled for. We will split the data 
into two sub-samples, one corresponding to micro firms and another one to larger firms, 
when carrying out the empirical analyses. In analytical terms what we will estimate is 
the following model:  
 
P(Bankruptcyi /FinancialDistress) = f (Tangibilityi,Control1i,...,ControlKi,ui)  
 
Notice that we do not face a sample selection bias by only keeping the financially 
distressed firms. Denoting Si  as a selection indicator that equals 1 if the observation is 
included in the sample and 0 otherwise, and icr  the interest coverage ratio: Si =1 if 
icri <1; Si = 0 if icri ≥1. As long as icr  is uncorrelated with u , the unobserved that 
factors that influence the decision to file for bankruptcy conditional on being in 
financial distress, our sampling mechanism S(icr)  will be exogenous. As the interest 
coverage ratio icr  is measured in 2008, two years before the measurement of our 
dependent variable BANKRUPTCY (2010), it seems safe to assume that 
BANKRUPTCY cannot have any influence on icr , implying E ui /S(icri)[ ] = 0 .  
 
5.1 Micro firms.  
 
The first set of results is shown in Table 6, which displays probit regressions for the 
probability of bankruptcy. Four specifications, where Age, Size and dummies for 
industry are used as controls, are shown for robustness. The table reveals that 
Tangibility is negatively correlated with the probability of bankruptcy in Spain, while 
positively correlated in France and the U.K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Empirical Analyses 
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Table 6: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (probit) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=3.6% (Spain), 10.5% (France), 31.6% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, 
significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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and the selected mechanism used to deal with insolvency (and hence the probability of 
bankruptcy) are jointly chosen by firms, causing a simultaneity bias. Moreover, 
Tangibility is expected to be measured with error, since tangible fixed assets are valued 
at their acquisition (historical) cost, which may differ from their market and collateral 
values. To solve these problems we use as instrumental variable (IV) the average 
industry level of tangibility –where industry is defined at 4 digits of disaggregation- in 
our sample41. We expect this IV to be uncorrelated with any unobserved determinant of 
the probability of bankruptcy of a single firm because no firm chooses the asset and 
capital structure of its industry counterparts. Moreover, there is a positive and sizeable 
correlation between the IV and the endogenous regressor –as reflected by first-stage 
regressions42- since companies for the same industries tend to have similar levels of 
tangibility 
 
The selected IV estimator is Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). We prefer not to use IV 
probit as our main estimator because its consistency relies in some strong assumptions 
such as conditional normality of the endogenous regressor (Wooldridge, 2002) that do 
not seem to hold in our case. Despite the well-known caveats of the linear probability 
model  (heteroskedasticity, fitted probabilities out of [0,1]), it requires weaker 
assumptions and it usually provides good approximations of the marginal effects 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Nevertheless, Appendix B shows the results when IV 
probit is used instead, revealing that the conclusions are robust to the selected estimator.  
 
The results for the estimation via 2SLS are displayed in Table 7. In the regressions for 
the Spanish subsample, the marginal effects of Tangibility are negative and highly 
significant, and they are substantially higher than those estimated without instrumenting 
the regressor. A 1% increase in Tangibility decreases the probability of filing for 
bankruptcy by a Spanish micro firm by around 0.03%. Notice that this is a sizeable 
effect because the baseline probability (the probability without conditioning in any 
regressor) of those firms is 3.6%. By contrast, the marginal effects of Tangibility are  
positive and significant both in France and the U.K.   
 
With respect to the control variables, size has a positive impact in the probability of 
bankruptcy in the three countries, suggesting that the fixed costs of bankruptcy 
procedures deter very small firms from using them, as argued by Morrison (2008). The 
case of age is less intuitive, since it has a positive effect in the Spanish and French 
subsamples while a negative one in the case of the U.K.  
                                                
41 In other words, the average level of tangibility is computed for each industry, regardless of the 
country. Although we could have instead computed the average industry-country level of tangibility to 
increase the variability of the IV, that variable may not be exogenous, since it may be influenced by the 
country’s institutional framework.  
42 Results available upon request.  
 
However, we expect the estimates of Table 6 to be biased due to the endogeneity of our 
key regressor, Tangibility. As previously explained, firms’ asset and capital structures 
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Table 7: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=3.6% (Spain), 10.5% (France), 31.6% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and 
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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5.2 Non-micro firms.  
 
The relationship between Tangibility and the probability of bankruptcy is, as expected, 
less strong for non-micro firms in the case of Spain. As a benchmark, Table 8 shows the 
(biased) probit estimates for the three countries, which shows the same patterns as for 
micro firms: negative correlations in Spain and positive correlations in France and the 
U.K.  
 
Table 8: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (probit) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=12.8% (Spain), 18.2% (France), 29.5% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, 
significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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An analysis of the consistent IV estimates in Table 9 shows that Tangibility has, unlike 
the case of micro firms, a positive impact on the probability on bankruptcy of Spanish 
non-micro firms in 3 out of the 4 specifications, but it is not significant in specification 
(4), suggesting that it is not a robust determinant. By contrast, Tangibility has a robust 
positive impact in the probability of bankruptcy both in France and the UK. 
 
With respect to the control variables, size has a positive impact in the probability of 
bankruptcy in Spain -as it was the case in the subsample of micro firms- but a negative 
one in France and the UK. A possible interpretation is that the fixed costs of bankruptcy 
proceedings deter small and very small firms from using them but, in the case of quite 
large firms, other factors, such as the reputational loss of managers, make filing for 
bankruptcy less appealing.  As in the case of micro firms, age has a positive effect in the 
Spanish subsample, but a negative one in the U.K and no robust impact in France.  
 
 
Table 9: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (2SLS) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=12.8% (Spain), 
18.2% (France), 29.5% (U.K.).  All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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5.3 Robustness analysis: weighted sample 
 
 
 
Table 10 shows, again as a benchmark, the results of a probit model for the probability 
of bankruptcy of a micro firm using sampling weights. Comparing it with Table 6 (no 
weights) we can see that results are remarkably similar for Spanish firms: there is a 
negative and significant correlation between Tangibility and the probability of 
bankruptcy, which is robust to all specifications. The correlation is positive and 
significant in the case of the U.K., as it was in the unweighted sample. By contrast, the 
conclusions do change for French firms: now such a relationship is not statistically 
different from zero in any specification.    
 
In the case of the consistent IV estimates, Table 11 corroborates the findings of Table 7 
(unweighted sample). Tangibility has a negative impact on the probability of 
bankruptcy of a Spanish micro firm. The effect is statistically and economically 
significant: a 1% increase in Tangibility decreases that probability by around 0.002%. 
Notice that this is a sizeable effect because the baseline probability (the probability 
without conditioning in any regressor) of those firms is 0.1%. By contrast, the effect is 
positive in the U.K. and non-robust in France, since it is insignificant in the most 
complete specification (4).  
 
The results for larger firms, which are displayed in Tables 12 y 13, confirm the findings 
for the unweighted sample in the case of Spain: Tangibility has no impact on the 
probability of bankruptcy, since it is not statistically different from zero in any IV 
estimation. By contrast, the effect is positive in the U.K. -as it was in the unweighted 
sample- and non-robust in France, since it is insignificant in the most complete IV 
estimation of specification (4), unlike the unweighted case. An interpretation of the 
contradictory results for France is that the associations between the two variables found 
in the unweighted sample were driven by some observations that were overrepresented 
in such a sample.  
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Table 10: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (probit) [weighted sample] 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=0.1% (Spain), 12.4% (France), 36.5% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 11: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (2SLS) [weighted sample] 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=0.1% (Spain), 12.4% (France), 36.5% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 12: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (probit) [weighted sample] 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=1.1% (Spain), 17.9% (France), 37.7% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 13: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (2SLS) [weighted sample] 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=12.8% (Spain), 18.2% (France), 29.5% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Sampling weights are used. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
 
 
 
5.4 Robustness analysis: subsample of firm exits.  
 
 
In our main sample we have two types of firms: bankrupt and non-bankrupt distressed 
firms.  The former consists of firms under bankruptcy proceedings (i.e., still operating 
in the market) and firms that have been liquidated after a bankruptcy procedure (i.e., 
they have exited the market).  The latter consists of companies that are still operating 
the market under financial distress and companies that exited the market while they 
were financially distressed. An alternative explanation for the negative impact of 
Tangibility on the probability of filing for bankruptcy by a Spanish micro firm is that 
firms with high levels of tangible fixed assets relative to their levels of financial debt 
still have assets they may pledge as mortgage collateral to get new loans or refinance 
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their current ones, so they may avoid bankruptcy because they manage to survive and 
stay in the market, rather than leaving via a foreclosure.  
 
We address this potential criticism by keeping in the sample only those firms that exited 
the market. We construct a new dependent variable, bankruptcy2, which takes the value 
1 if the firm left the market after a bankruptcy procedure and 0 otherwise. Our main 
results are the same: Tangibility has a negative and significant impact on the probability 
of being bankrupt in the case of Spanish micro firms (see Table 15). This effect does 
not seem to take place in Spanish larger firms, since the correlation is not different from 
zero in our probit estimates (see Table 16) and the causal impact is not robust to several 
specifications in our IV estimates (see Table 17). By contrast, Tangibility has a positive 
impact on the probability of leaving the market after bankruptcy in the case of French 
firms of both size classes, while there is no effect in the case of British firms.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (probit) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=61.8% (Spain), 77.3% (France), 89.8% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, 
significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 15: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (2SLS) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=61.8% (Spain), 77.3% (France), 89.8% (U.K.). 
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and 
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 16: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (probit)  
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=76.1% (Spain), 76.3% (France), 91.3% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: Probit. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, 
significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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Table 17: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (2SLS)  
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=76.1% (Spain), 76.3% (France), 91.3% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: 2SLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and 
***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level.  
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by the behaviour of micro firms –the majority of Spanish firms-, which rarely file for 
bankruptcy when dealing with financial distress.  
 
This paper presents and tests a hypothesis that attempts to explain this empirical 
finding. According to this hypothesis, Spanish micro firms and their lenders avoid filing 
for bankruptcy by making possible that creditors foreclose on the company’s assets. 
Since most of their secured credits are mortgage loans (i.e., loans secured on land and 
buildings), debt enforcement takes place via mortgage foreclosures (ejecuciones 
hipotecarias). This is a more attractive way to deal with financial distress because 
mortgage foreclosures are much cheaper and quicker than the bankruptcy system 
(concurso de acreedores). Furthermore, personal bankruptcy is a very unattractive 
option because it is extremely severe towards the individual debtor. Since the costs of 
filing for personal bankruptcy are substantial while the benefits are almost none, (de 
jure or de facto) unlimited liability firms have strong incentives to avoid filing for 
bankruptcy and use mortgage foreclosures instead.  
 
The above hypothesis implies that financially distressed firms with a high proportion of 
mortgage loans should rarely file for bankruptcy in Spain, while this phenomenon 
should not be observed in other institutional settings where the bankruptcy system is 
more attractive than mortgage foreclosures or secured credit does not heavily rely on 
buildings or land as collateral. While we cannot directly test the hypothesis, we can test 
its implication. If the empirical evidence corroborates it, we can conclude that the 
hypothesis is not falsified by our analyses, shedding some light on the research 
question. Hence, the identification strategy consists of testing whether a higher 
percentage of mortgage loans imply a lower probability of filing for bankruptcy in the 
case of Spanish distressed firms. As the comparison group we use distressed firms from 
France and the U.K. 
 
Our main findings do not falsify the proposed hypothesis. We find that a higher 
proportion of tangible fixed assets (the assets that can be used as mortgage collateral in 
Spain) over total financial debt significantly decrease the probability of being in 
bankruptcy among Spanish micro firms in financial distress, while this does not hold 
neither for Spanish larger businesses nor for firms from the other countries. 
 
Our study may have policy implications because bankruptcy procedures and mortgage 
foreclosures are not perfect substitutes, and the underutilization of one of them may lead 
to efficiency losses and lower welfare (García-Posada, 2012). An unattractive personal 
bankruptcy law may also discourage entrepreneurship, firm entry and innovation. It is 
important to note, however, that these results are based on data that do not capture yet 
the impact of the recent reforms of the Spanish insolvency framework –regarding both 
corporate and personal bankruptcy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Spain had, before the current economic crisis, one of the world’s lowest business 
bankruptcy rates, i.e., number of business bankruptcies divided by the total number of 
firms in the economy. Only the crisis has modestly increased the number of 
bankruptcies, but the Spanish bankruptcy rate is still relatively low. This fact is driven 
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APPENDIX A: LEGAL TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO INSOLVENCY 
PROCEDURES, SECURED LENDING AND FORECLOSURES UNDER 
SPANISH, ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW. 
 
A.1. Some preliminary clarifications.  
 
Legal terms are difficult to translate and do not have exact equivalents in different legal 
systems. Basic concepts such as a “floating charge” (under English Law) have not a 
direct translation into Spanish Law or French Law. Furthermore, Spanish or French 
Law basic terms like “hipoteca”43 or “hypothèque”44 cannot be unambiguously 
translated as "mortgage" in the British law. This appendix attempts to clarify the main 
concepts used in this paper. 
 
In all cases, we define “insolvency” as a situation in which the debtor is unable to pay 
debts when they are due (cash-flow insolvency)45. This situation is known in French law 
as “cessation de paiements” or “faillite” and in Spanish Law as “quiebra” or 
“bancarrota”. In this appendix we focus on the analysis of insolvency once that 
insolvency situation has been formally recognized. Previously, the debtor, in any 
country, could have tried to reach an out-of-court arrangement or private workout with 
its creditors by which the creditors could accept less than the full amount (or in some 
cases, the full amount, if it can be determined without the aid of any legal proceeding) 
they are owed. If those possible arrangements fail or they are not even attempted, in 
Spain there is a formal procedure to resolve an insolvency situation called "concurso" 
(“concurso de acreedores”). In this paper the Spanish procedure is compared with the 
main procedures for corporate insolvency in France (the “redressement judiciare”46 –a 
reorganisation procedure- and the “liquidation judiciare” –a liquidation one47) and in 
the U.K. (“administration” and, before 2003, “administrative receivership”)48.  
 
The Spanish insolvency procedure, until very recently, applied to consumers and all 
types of firms, including both limited liability companies and personally owned 
businesses with no limit to personal liability. In September 2013 the Spanish Parliament 
has approved some legal reforms in this regard that are summarized in section A.6. By 
contrast, there are specific procedures for personal debtors both in France and the U.K., 
which may be used by consumers, self-employed individuals and owners of small firms 
that used personal guarantees to fund their businesses. France has two procedures, the 
“plan de redressement” and the “procedure de rétablissement personnel”, while 
                                                
43 In Spanish law, Article 1874 et seq of the Spanish Civil Code. 
44 Articles 2393 et seq of the French Civil Code. 
45 See Armour (2001) for a discussion on the different types of insolvency. 
46 Law 2005-845 of July 26, 2005 “de sauvegarde des enterprises”. 
47 A new procedure, the sauvegarde, was introduced in the latest reform of the bankruptcy code (Loi de 
sauvegarde des entreprises), which came became effective in 2006. In addition, the parties have the 
possibility to recur to a "réglement amiable" equally supervised by a judge 
48 Other (much less used) procedures are company voluntary arrangements – a reorganization procedure- 
compulsory liquidations and creditors’ voluntary liquidations.  
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“bankruptcy” is the main insolvency procedure for individuals in the U.K49. It is 
necessary to remark that, in the U.K., the term “bankruptcy” only applies to individuals, 
while insolvency is the term that is used for companies. Once taken into account this 
legal notice, we must note that the term "bankruptcy" is used in this paper as a general 
term to denote formal insolvency procedures in general (as used in American Standard 
English). 
 
 
 
A.2. The equivalents in Spanish and French law of the UK insolvency proceedings.  
 
In the U.K. the main corporate insolvency procedure is called "administration". 
"Administrative receivership" is not available from September 15, 2003 (although, of 
course, we could still observe some active cases) due to the adoption of the Enterprise 
Act 2002. This case is discussed separately in Section A.4. 
 
In the case of “administration”, an administrator is appointed and tries to reach a better 
outcome for creditors than the one that could be achieved in a liquidation by the debtor. 
The administration is requested before a judge by the insolvent company or its creditors 
(among other options). If the judge deems that there is actually a situation of 
insolvency, she will issue an "administration order". It is very important to note that the 
holder of a “floating charge” (concept explained below) can appoint an administrator 
even without court order. This administrator, however, will take care of the interests of 
all creditors (and not only of the floating charge holder, unlike in the administrative 
receivership procedure, see section A.4). 
 
As it was mentioned, the procedures closer to "administration" in French and Spanish 
Law are, respectively, the “redressement judiciare" and the "concurso de acreedores". 
In all these cases there is judicial supervision of the procedures and the judge may 
appoint an administrator (or a similar figure) for the insolvent company.50   
 
 
A.3. The equivalents in Spanish and French law of the security interests in the UK 
law.  
 
 
A.3.a Fixed charge 
 
A “fixed charge” is defined over a determined (specific) movable or immovable 
property. That is, the goods secured by a fixed charge must be clearly identifiable (in 
contrast to the “floating charge”).  
 
There are several types of fixed charges in English Law: “mortgage over land and 
buildings owned by the company”, "chattels mortgage" or the “charge against goodwill 
and other intellectual property rights”.  
                                                
49 Bankruptcy in Scotland is referred to as “sequestration”. Other personal insolvency procedures in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland are individual voluntary arrangements and debt relief orders, while 
another one in Scotland is a “protected trust deed”.   
50 This last circumstance only occurs in some specific cases in French law (in which the judge appoints 
an "Administrateur Judiciaire"). 
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The first type of fixed charge is the one that is closest to what in Spanish law we call 
"hipoteca" (which is a “derecho real”, “Real Right Law”). It is regulated by articles 
1874 et seq of the Spanish Civil Code. The figure is close to the "hypothèque" in French 
law (articles 2393 et seq of the French Civil Code). When there is a hipoteca or 
equivalent figures, the ownership of the property remains to the buyer, but there is a 
charge over that property right which disappears only when the loan has been repaid. 
 
In the case of a "chattels mortgage", the purchaser borrows funds for the purchase of 
movable property (the chattel). The lender secures the loan with a mortgage over the 
chattel. Legal ownership of the chattel is transferred to the purchaser at the time of 
purchase, and the mortgage is removed once the loan has been repaid.  
 
Potentially similar legal figures exist in Spanish law as the "prenda"51 (which is also a 
“derecho real”) or the "prenda sin desplazamiento" and "hipoteca mobiliaria" governed 
by the Ley de Hipoteca mobiliaria y prenda sin desplazamiento52 (thus out of the 
Spanish Civil Code). Also potentially similar concepts exist in French Law, such as the 
"gage" and the "nantissement".53 
 
As a result, "hipoteca" and "mortgage" are not directly interchangeable terms. 
"Mortgage" in English law would idenfity a set of guarantees/securities on goods that 
could be, roughly, the "derechos reales" in continental law (Spanish and French Law). 
To avoid confusion, in this paper we identify what we call "hipoteca" in Spain as 
"mortgage over land and buildings54" (for brevity of exposition, just “mortgage”), i.e., 
the first type of fixed charge discussed in this section. 
 
 
A.3.b Floating charge 
 
 
Unlike the "fixed charge" (and its specificities), the "floating charge" has no strict 
equivalent in Spanish or French law. The Civil Code in both countries requires that the 
secured assets must be clearly identifiable. However, one would talk about some 
similarities in the case of the "prenda sin desplazamiento" of the Spanish law.55 
                                                
51 Article 1863 et seq of the Spanish Civil Code. 
52 Ley de hipoteca mobiliaria y prenda sin desplazamiento of December 16, 1954. 
53 Articles 2333 et seq of the French Civil Code in the first case and 2355 and subsequent articles in the 
second case. 
54 These “buildings” may also include the entrepreneur’s home. We do not use the concept "real estate" 
directly to avoid confusion, since it is sometimes (mistakenly) used as a synonym for residential 
buildings, excluding commercial buildings. Following the Black’s Law Dictionary, “Real estate” is 
defined as “Land and anything permanently affixed to the land, such as buildings (…) The term is 
generally synonymous with real property”.  
55 In other Spanish-speaking or French-speaking legal systems and with evident influence of both 
continental and Anglo-Saxon Law, we could find legal figures such as the "charge flottante" 
("nantissement flottante") of the Canadian Law and the "prenda flotante" which exists in some American 
legal systems.  
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A floating charge is a security interest over a fund of changing assets56 of a firm that 
“floats” until it “crystallises” (converts) into a fixed charge, at which point the charge 
attaches to specific assets. The crystallisation can be triggered by a number of events, 
being one of them the borrower’s default. In other words, the “floating charge” is public 
and takes effect only when the company has failed to fulfil its obligations. The main 
difference of the floating charge relative to other security interests such as the fixed 
charge is that, because the security "floats", the firm remains free to purchase and sell 
assets. That is, the company remains in possession of the property and can dispose of it 
in the normal course of business.   
 
Unlike traditional collateral (Derechos reales, as explained above) in Civil Law, the 
floating charge covers not only present property but also the future property of the 
debtor, while giving the debtor the right to dispose of it. At the time of the 
crystallization, the “floating” charge is fixed and the beneficiary may then exercise its 
rights over it.57 The "floating charge" is based on property that has not already been 
specifically mortgaged or pledged. 
 
In summary, compared to the flexibility of the floating charge (that is not related to any 
good in particular until there is a crystallization as a result of the insolvency of the 
debtor), the “derechos reales” (hipotecas, prendas, etc) in Spain are "specific" in 
nature. The "hipoteca" for example, is a security that gives its holder an immediate and 
direct right over immovable property (mainly land and buildings, including homes 
obviously) that can be exercised and made effective against any other creditor. The 
"prenda", meanwhile, is a security that gives the holder a right over movable property. 
 
 
A.4 Administrative receivership 
 
Although, as noted, this procedure is no longer available, there are still some active 
cases. That is why this paper refers to that procedure. In the “receivership”, the holder 
of a "floating charge" could take control of the whole company. That is, in the case of 
default, the holder of the "floating charge" had the right to appoint an administrative 
receiver, who assumed all the powers of the company’s board of directors. The 
objective of the administrative receiver was simply to realize sufficient funds to repay 
the debt of the holder of the floating charge (Franks and Sussman, 2005, Davydenko 
and Franks, 2008). 
 
Naturally, this procedure did not prevent other creditors exercise their right to judicial 
oversight of the insolvency of the debtor. However, the floating charge holder had the 
ability to veto other procedures, particularly the "administration", if he appointed an 
administrative receiver. As it was noted, after the disappearance of the administrative 
receivership procedure (after September 15, 2003), judicial supervision (through the 
process of "administration") has become the standard way to proceed in UK Law. 
                                                
56 For this reason, this legal figure may be “translated” in Spanish, not into Spanish law, as "prenda 
rotativa". 
57 The crystallization has the effect of designating the property referred to and make it enforceable 
against third parties. 
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As it was introduced above, in Spain a creditor may secure a loan, among other options, 
through a contract of "prenda" (over movable property), a “hipoteca” (on immovable 
assets) and other legal figures with characteristics of one or the other (hipoteca 
mobiliaria, prenda sin desplazamiento). All these contracts are forms of "Real Rights" 
(derechos reales) as the good is well identified (in all these cases we would be talking 
about "mortgages" under UK Law, included under the category of "fixed charges"). 
 
Both the "prenda" as the "hipoteca" must appear in a public document that facilitates 
execution (if needed). Moreover, in the case of the hipoteca, the Spanish Law also 
requires to be registered in the land registry. The creditor, in the event of loan default by 
the debtor, may proceed to execute its right over the property (the “acción hipotecaria” 
if there was a “hipoteca” contract and “acción prendaria o pignoraticia” if there was a 
“prenda”). In Spain, in both cases the creditor may recourse to a judicial enforcement 
(if performed by a judge) or an out of court enforcement (if performed by a notary). 
 
The judicial enforcement58, both in the case of prendas and hipotecas, is regulated by 
the Civil Procedural Law and establishes an auction with various guarantees to the 
parties. The extrajudicial execution59, whether in either case, is done before a notary 
also by auction (with citation of the debtor and the owner of the prenda where 
applicable). 
 
In the U.K. there is the so-called “foreclosure”, which could be defined as a debt 
enforcement procedure aimed at recovering money owed to “secured” creditors 
(Djankov et al. 2008). Derived from the above definition we must directly rule out a 
direct legal equivalence between "foreclosure" and "ejecución or acción hipotecaria". 
That is, we must be very specific when using these terms. Therefore, we should 
“translate” “ejecución de un bien mueble pignorado” (acción pignoraticia) as a 
“foreclose on a pledged movable asset” under UK Law. Then, if the property is an 
immovable asset (e.g. a building, a plant, the home of the entrepreneur), we could use 
the term “land and building mortgage foreclosure” in the case of an execution (acción 
hipotecaria in Spain). In the main text, as explained in the introduction, we simplify the 
terminology and, for brevity of exposition, we use the term “mortgage foreclosure”.  
 
Alongside the Spanish case, in France we can find a "droit réel de gage" or 
"nantissement" on (tangible or intangible) movable property (the closest Spanish legal 
concept is therefore the "prenda") and a "hypothèque" on immovable property (the 
closest Spanish figure, as it was discussed, would be the “hipoteca”). The French 
enforcement procedure in the case of immovable property (“saisie immobilière”) differs 
with respect to that in Spain, in the fact that judicial intervention is always needed. The 
judicial intervention will take place either via a huissier (bailiff) or the enforcement 
judge directly "juge d'exécution". Like in Spain, the execution of fixed charge/security 
over a movable property (mise à exécution d´un gage ou d´un nantissement) can be 
either judicial or extrajudicial.60 
                                                
58 Regulated in the article 681 et seq of the Civil Procedural Law of Spain. Law 1/2000, of January 7, de 
Enjuiciamiento Civil. 
59 Governed by article 1872 of the Spanish Civil Code in the case of movable property and article 222 et 
seq of the Reglamento para la Ejecución de la Ley Hipotecaria (Decree of February 14, 1947) if the 
property was secured by a “hipoteca”. 
60 Articles 2347 and 2355 of the French Civil Code respectively. 
 
A.5. Foreclosures, ejecuciones prendarias and related procedures.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1315
 
The specific rules governing the executions of fixed charges over immovable property 
assets can be found in the “Code des procédures civiles d’exécution”61 and its 
regulations. The execution (procédure of saisie immobilière) takes place after the proper 
formal notifications to the debtor. In this procedure, as in Spain, there may be a forced 
sale of the (immovable/land, buildings, etc) mortgaged property (“vente forcée”) by 
auction (“vente aux enchères”) if it was not possible to do it in another way (“vente 
amiable”). 
 
 
A.6. Recent developments in Spanish Law.  
 
 
Until very recently, in Spain the insolvency procedures available for self-employed 
individuals and entrepreneurs (i.e., managers/owners of small firms) were governed by 
the same rules than in the case of large businesses such as a limited liability companies. 
In September 2013 the Spanish Parliament has approved a law that will create some sort 
of special bankruptcy regime for them62. The law contemplates introducing some 
limitation of the liability of the entrepreneur / self-employed individual through the new 
figure of "Entrepreneur with Limited Liability". This figure will allow that part of the 
assets of the entrepreneur will be exempted in case of insolvency, namely EUR 300,000 
invested in its primary residence. The law also introduces a partial “fresh start”: the 
entrepreneur will be discharged of her pre-bankruptcy debts as longs as she pays in full 
the preferential, secured and privileged credit and at least a 25% of the ordinary credit63. 
Finally, the law establishes a new insolvency procedure, the acuerdo extrajudicial de 
pagos, an extrajudicial debt workout coordinated by a public mediator. If no agreement 
is reached between the debtor and her creditors, a judicial bankruptcy procedure 
(concurso de acreedores) will follow, but the negotiation attempt will increase the fresh 
start: no ordinary credit will have to be reimbursed.  
 
We must keep in mind that in Spain, as a general rule, it is not possible to apply a 
principle of limited liability to the debtor (that is, legally release the debtor from its 
debts, fully or partially, when it cannot pay). This is the so-called "principle of universal 
liability" (article 1911 of the Civil Code)64 that states that the debtor responds with all 
present and future assets to the fulfilment of its obligations.  
 
The process of ejecución hipotecaria has also undergone some reforms very recently 
(2013) which we should summarise here but do not affect the results of this paper. In 
parallel to the debate on the judgment “Aziz vs CatalunyaCaixa”65, the Law 1/2013 
opens avenues to override clauses that impose “excessive” interest rates to the debtor, 
                                                
61 The specific rules in these cases can be found in the " Code des procédures civiles d’exécution " (Title 
II, Articles L.311-1 to L.322-14 and Title III) and its regulations. 
62 Ley de apoyo a los emprendedores y su internacionalización.  
63 Preferential credit (créditos contra la masa) comprises salaries for the last month of activity, the costs 
of the procedure itself, including compensation for the insolvency administrators, plus the new debt 
incurred by the firm in its activities after the insolvency declaration. Privileged credit (créditos con 
privilegio general) mainly comprises other labour credits, tax debts and social security contributions.  
64 Also articles 605 to 607 of the Civil Procedural Law. 
65 Judgment in Case C-415/11of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
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through a reform of the Ley Hipotecaria66. The reform also increases from one to three 
the minimum number of payments that must be missed before the foreclosure process 
can be started and it allows suspending for two years the evictions of debtors when they 
are considered to be especially vulnerable. It also reformed the auction process by 
amending the Civil Procedure Act. Specifically, it has lowered the security required to 
tenderers. 
 
 
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATIONS WITH IV PROBIT 
 
In the main text we have reported the IV estimations via Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) because that estimator relies on weaker assumptions than its non-linear 
counterpart, the IV probit67. In this appendix, as a robustness check, we show the results 
using the latter on the unweighted sample68. The conclusions are the same: Tangibility 
has a negative impact on the probability of bankruptcy of Spanish micro firms, no 
robust effect for Spanish non-micro firms and a positive one in French and British 
companies, regardless of their size. In the case of Spanish micro firms, a 1% increase in 
Tangibility decreases the probability of filing for bankruptcy by around 0.03% in the 
most complete specification (4). Comparing the marginal effects of tables 7 (2SLS) and 
B1 (IV Probit) we can see that the impact of Tangibility is somewhat stronger when 
estimated by IV Probit.  
 
An advantage of the IV probit is that allows us to directly test for the endogeneity of our 
regressor. It basically tests whether there is correlation between the error terms of the 
structural equation and those of the reduced-form equation for the endogenous 
regressor. Moreover, this test, unlike the IV probit itself, is valid without assuming 
conditional normality of the endogenous regressor or homoskedasticity. The results of 
the test, which are shown in the last row of each country in Table B1 and Table B2, 
generally reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, suggesting that we need to instrument 
the variable Tangibility, as we already did.  
                                                
66 Article 3 of Law 1/2013, of May 14, de medidas para reforzar la protección a los deudores 
hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda y alquiler social. 
67 The IV probit can be estimated via a two-step procedure or via Maximum Likelihood. We use the latter 
because, although computationally more expensive and difficult to converge, it is more efficient 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
68 Although sampling weights can be applied to the Maximum Likelihood version of the IV probit, its 
algorithm often fails to converge, as it happened in several of our regressions.  
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Table B1: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in micro 
firms (IV Probit) 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=3.6% (Spain), 10.5% (France), 31.6% (U.K.).  
All regressions include a constant. Estimator: IV probit. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***, 
significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level. The exogeneity test is a Wald test that follows a chi-squared with one 
degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, i.e., no correlation between the error terms of 
the structural equation and those of the reduced-form equation for the endogenous regressor. 
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Table B2: average marginal effects (%) for the probability of bankruptcy in non-
micro firms (IV Probit)  
 
 
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Dependent variable: Bankruptcy. Baseline probabilities=12.5% (Spain), 
18.4% (France), 44.7% (U.K.).  All regressions include a constant. Estimator: IV Probit. Standard errors 
in parentheses. *, **, and ***, significant at 10, 5, and 1 % level. The exogeneity test is a Wald test that 
follows a chi-squared with one degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, i.e., no 
correlation between the error terms of the structural equation and those of the reduced-form equation for 
the endogenous regressor. 
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